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PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
Edward H. Cooper* 
The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (15 
U.S.C. § 13), undertakes to outlaw price "discrimination" upon 
proof of threatened injury to competition, and subject to specified 
defenses. Lawyers often bewail the fact that administration of this 
statute frequently fails to conform to an economist's notion of dis-
crimination. For the most part, the complaints are addressed to the 
clear fact that, as drafted and interpreted, the statute wreaks unnec-
essary damage. In the name of protecting competition, competition 
and economic efficiency are often curtailed. 
To some uncertain extent, the economic losses encountered in 
the administration of a price discrimination law may be accepted in 
the pursuit of social or political goals. In the perennial ebb and 
flow of proposals to abolish or to amend the statute, however, argu-
ments are continually made that it serves economic goals as well. 
_ Such arguments commonly fail to recognize the enormous difficul-
ties that confront any statutory attempt to improve the pursuit of eco-
nomic efficiency by regulating price discrimination. These diffi-
culties are so great that a price discrimination statute is apt to serve 
economic efficiency only incidentally and accidentally, if at all. These 
difficulties do not arise from any supposed fact that price differences 
in real transactions must always rest upon foundations of economic 
efficiency. Often they do not. Instead, the difficulties arise from 
two quite different limitations on economic theory and our ability 
to apply economic theory in practice. 
The first limitation arises from the fact that price discrimination 
is not a single phenomenon, but a wide variety of often complex 
phenom~na, some of which may prove more desirable than nondis-
criminatory pricing. Unambiguous demonstration that a given set of 
pricing transactions involves price discrimination does not by itself 
answer the question whether it is desirable discrimination. The first 
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part of this essay is a brief and almost allusive reminder of the dif-
ficulties that must be encountered in attempting to determine 
whether a particular instance of price discrimination is intrinsically 
desirable. 
The second limitation arises from the difficulties of determining 
whether a particular set of pricing transactions in fact involves price 
discrimination. These difficulties arise primarily from the complex 
variety of considerations that must be taken into account, and the 
inadequacy of available measuring devices to account for them. In 
some part, these difficulties also reflect unresolved problems in 
achieving a suitable abstract definition of price discrimination. In 
combination, these sources of difficulty pose great problems for the 
administration of any statute that might be drafted in an attempt to 
minimize interference with desirable competition and economic effi-
ciency, whether the ultimate purpose is to improve economic per-
formance or to pursue noneconomic goals. The second part of this 
essay is an exploration of these problems, illustrated in large part 
by familiar issues that have emerged in administering the present 
statute. There will be enough shift in perspective, however, to war-
rant omission of the obvious citations in order to present an abstract 
statement of the general problem. 
Any reevaluation of present price discrimination law must ac-
count for these limitations of discrimination doctrine, both in 
theory and in practical application. The conclusion offered here is 
that, even with substantial changes in present law, economic effi-
ciency is more apt to be restrained than furthered by any effort at 
legal control. If discrimination is to be outlawed, justification must 
be found in the pursuit of social and political goals, or in the belief 
that long-run economic values may be purchased only at some sacri-
fice of short-run efficiency. 
I. THE DESIRABILITY OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
In economic theory, price discrimination means only that the 
same product is sold to different customers at prices that are not re-
lated to differences in the costs of dealing with them. The clearest 
illustration of such discrimination is the charging by a seller of dif-
ferent prices even though all costs are equal. Despite the tendency 
of a modern ear to hear overtones of unjustifiable differentiation in 
the very term "price discrimination," economists do not mean to im-
ply that all discrimination is undesirable. Matters are much more 
complex than that. There are many phenomena of price discrimi-
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nation, some of which are often desirable. A blanket prohibition 
of price discrimination, accordingly, would often produce undesir-
able results. The complexity of these phenomena is sketched in this 
section, on the assumption that price discrimination is clearly in-
volved. A discussion of the difficulty of identifying price discrimi-
nation is deferred to section II. 
A. Monopoly Price Discrimination 
A comparison of the results of uniform pricing by a "monopolist" 
with the results of price discrimination by a monopolist provides the 
simplest example of the complex results of discrimination. Assum-
ing that the cost of serving all customers is equal, a competitive 
market would ensure equal prices to all customers. Different prices 
could be charged different customers only by a firm that has market 
power coupled with the ability to prevent low-price customers from 
reselling to high-price customers. The gains to such a seller from 
charging different prices to different customers result from variations 
in the intensity of their demand. Suppose, for example, that it costs 
$49 to produce and deliver one fergustrol to any customer, and that 
there is one customer who would pay $100 for a fergustrol, four who 
would pay $90 for one each, and three more who would pay $50 
for one each. If the seller were to price individually, it would sell 
eight fergustrols for $610, incur costs of $392 (assuming there were 
no costs in identifying the different purchasers' distinctive demands 
and preventing arbitrage among them) and realize a pure profit of 
$218. If the seller were forced to charge a profit-maximizing single 
price, it would charge $_90, sell five fergustrols for $450, and realize 
a pure profit of $205. At a uniform price of $100, it would make 
one sale and realize total revenues of $100 and a profit of only $51, 
and at a uniform price of $50, it would make eight sales, and realize 
total revenues of $400 and a profit of only $8. 
The seller may not be the only one to benefit from the practice 
of substituting price discrimination for a profit-maximizing single 
price. In the example just given, the profit-maximizing single price 
would reduce output from eight units-the level that would be 
reached by competitive sellers-to five. In the real world as well, 
price discrimination can bring the allocation of productive resources 
and output closer to that which would occur in a competitive market, 
and it can make the product available to customers who otherwise 
would not enjoy it. The major obstacle to achieving this result lies 
in the difficulty and the cost of obtaining sufficient information about 
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the demand intensities of different customers. Ordinarily, custom-
ers are apt to be lumped into groups for purposes of discriminatory 
pricing. The result is likely to be reduced output as to the higher-
priced groups of customers, and increased output as to the lower-
priced groups. It may be that generally circumstances are such that 
on balance output will be increased as compared to that produced 
at the profit-maximizing single price. Even if it is not, however, the 
product will be made available to some customers who would not 
have enjoyed it at the profit-maximizing single price. In more ex-
treme circumstances, it is possible to show that with plausible as-
sumptions about declining costs, price discrimination can result in 
lower prices to all purchasers, or even in the production of a product 
that could not be produced at all if sales were required to be made 
at a single price. 
The fact that price discrimination by a firm with market power 
may bring the allocation of resources closer to that which would be 
achieved in a competitive market does not lead to an easy conclusion 
that the law should allow such discrimination. Initially, it must be 
recognized that it may often be very difficult to determine the actual 
impact of discrimination on resource use. In addition, an expansion 
of output in one imperfect market may have been purchased only 
at the cost of attracting resources away from another imperfect 
market in which they were better employed. Finally, even if price 
discrimination brings the allocation of productive resources closer to 
the allocation that would result from competition, it is attended by in-
come effects quite different from those that would be achieved by 
competition. 
The income transfers that attend price discrimination are easily 
illustrated. Using the figures employed above, the discriminating 
seller who charges $100 to the fergustrol customer with the most in-
tense demand has extracted the $51 "surplus" that the customer 
would have enjoyed at the competitive price of $49. Despite 
a possible intuitive reaction that it would be better to allow cus-
tomers to retain and enjoy the surplus generated by the intensity 
of their own desires, the income transfer itself may be desirable. 
One common example is the small-town doctor, whose income 
from discriminating against high-income patients results in locat-
ing an office where no doctor would serve if fees were forced 
down to a single level that could be paid by all patients. The high-
income patients benefit by enjoying a service that would not other-
wise be made available. Even if medical services would other-
wise be provided, it may be reasonable to assume that many doctors 
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seek to attain a satisfactory income rather than a maximum income, 
and that the higher charges to rich patients "support" lower charges 
to poorer patients. The resulting transfer from the rich to the poor 
might well be approved. On a more general level, however, it may 
be difficult to establish useful criteria for appraising the desirability 
of enabling some customers to enjoy discriminatory prices below a 
profit-maximizing single price at the expense of income transfers 
from higher-price customers to the supplier. 
Price discrimination, in short, is possible only because of market 
power. If competition were possible, it might generally be pre-
ferred. But once the requisite market power is present, whatever its 
sources, price discrimination may have either desirable or undesir-
able effects on resource allocation and income distribution, and it 
may be astonishingly difficult to identify and appraise such effects 
in individual cases. 
B. Discrimination and Price Competition 
Oligopoly markets present some of the most complex phenomena 
of price discrimination. Systematized price discrimination may pro-
vide a helpful or even essential means of stifling the temptation of 
individual firms to engage in price competition that proves costly for 
all. Sporadic price discrimination, on the other hand, may serve ini-
tially as the only source of price competition in a market in which 
none dare to cut prices across the board. Over time, it may prolif-
erate into generalized competitive pricing, or at least lead the way 
to oligopoly stability at a lower price level. Prohibition of system-
atized price discrimination in such a setting could easily have desir-
able results, but prohibition of all price discrimination could prove 
very costly. 
The multiple basing-point pricing system once practiced by 
cement producers may serve to illustrate the potentiality for adverse 
effects from price discrimination in an oligopoly setting. Under the 
system, many producing points became "basing points," while some 
were not. Prices to all customers were determined by calculating 
the cheapest total of a basing-point price plus rail-freight charges 
from the basing point. The irrationality of the system is most drama-
tically shown by considering the pricing practices of a nonbasing-
point seller. Suppose that the price at the nearest basing point was 
$1.45 a barrel, and that rail freight to the seller's location was 
twenty-five cents. The nonbasing-point seller would charge $1.70 
to a next-door customer who took delivery at the seller's own loading 
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dock, $1.45 to a customer at the basing point despite freight costs 
of twenty-five cents, and $1.70 to a customer who was located at 
a twenty-five cent rail-freight cost in the opposite direction from the 
basing point. Net receipts on the respective sales would be $1.70, 
$1.20, and $1.20. 
The aggregate cost to the cement industry of maintaining the 
basing-point system must have been staggering in terms of cross-
hauling and increased selling costs. Yet the cement producers bore 
these costs; indeed, there was overwhelming evidence that the sys-
tem originated in overt collusion and was maintained by overtly col-
lusive behavior. The reasons for colluding to maintain such a costly 
system lie in its contribution to oligopoly price calculation. These rea-
sons make it clear that the system was properly held unlawful even 
apart from the collusion. Cement is a homogeneous product, and small 
price differences can easily shift customers from one supplier to an-
other. The demand of end-users is highly price-inelastic, however, 
so that even substantial price reductions would not substantially in-
crease total use. During periods of vast excess producing_capacity 
and high fixed costs, the pressure on cement producers to seek ad-
ditional business by shading prices closer to marginal costs was very 
strong. Each producer, absent the basing-point system, would have 
been left virtually helpless to avoid price competition, even if every 
producer had adopted a well-publicized f.o.b. price. Individual cus-
tomers could have claimed unverifiable advantages in arranging 
f .o.b. delivery from different suppliers, or in arranging nonrail trans-
portation. A supplier would have been left uncertain as to the price 
that would exactly match those of its rivals. Each supplier, more-
over, would be aware that his competitors faced the same pricing 
uncertainty and the same temptation to shade prices to win increased 
business. The pressure to anticipate price competition from others 
-whether deliberate or inadvertent-by a bit of preventive price 
competition would have been very strong. Added to these pres-
sures would be the pressure resulting from the fact that over time 
demand would be apt to fluctuate much more in the territories of 
natural freight advantage peculiar to each supplier than over areas 
that embrace many suppliers. Given the will to avoid price compe-
tition, the basing-point system made it possible to avoid all of these 
dangers. With such a system, each firm knew exactly what price 
would be charged by its competitors and that differences in delivery 
arrangements would not have significant price effects. Thus, price 
competition was successfully avoided, even during the Great De-
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pression. It is almost incredible to suppose that this result could 
have been achieved without the basing-point system. 
Other pricing systems as well may facilitate oligopoly price calcu-
lation and the avoidance of price competition. The basing-point 
system, however, suffers peculiar additional disadvantages. To the 
extent that it is successful, it may interfere with long-range adjust-
ments in productive capacity, and in times of declining demand it 
may facilitate survival of the financially strong rather than the effi-
cient. Customers who purchase products sold on a basing-point 
system may tend to locate near basing points rather than nonbasing 
point producers, although in the cement industry it seems very 
unlikely that many cement users would base their own locational de-
cisions on basing-point locations. If the system is maintained long 
enough, it is possible that new production capacity may locate near 
the basing points by the self-reinforcing attraction of customers' lo-
cational decisions. 
In contrast to the impact of systematized price discrimination, spo-
radic price discrimination may have highly beneficial effects in up-
setting oligopoly price calculation. The other side of the picture just 
painted for the effects of the basing-point system is that individual 
sellers, _faced with excess capacity, may often believe that it is worth-
while to engage in hidden price competition. Discriminatorily favor-
able prices to particularly desirable or fickle customers may be the 
most likely form of such competition, in the hope that they may pass 
completely undetected, or that if detected they may be ignored or 
met with comparably limited competition, or that if detected and met 
with generalized price competition the delay in detection will yield 
sufficient profit to repay the gamble. Alternatively some firms may 
feel compelled to initiate such discrimination and competition by the 
fear that others have started already, or may soon start. 
These contrasting aspects of price discrimination in an oligop-
oly setting suggest that it would be more useful to focus directly 
on the problems of oligopoly pricing systems than on the fact that 
one or more individual sellers are engaging in discrimination. It is 
possible to urge that the effect of reducing price competition is a 
desirable means of avoiding excessive rivalry that could lead to 
wasteful fluctuations in capacity over the general economic cycle. 
This argument has not been accepted with respect to explicit price-
fixing, and it probably should not be accepted with respect to a sys-
tematized method of price computation adhered to by individual oli-
gopolists without explicit collusion. Present conspiracy doctrine 
could easily be expanded to prohibit undesirable oligopoly pricing 
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systems without requiring proof of some traditional form of "agree-
ment." If such an approach proves inadequate, however, it would 
be better to seek a remedy in new legislation addressed to the prob-
lem of oligopoly behavior rather than to rely on concepts of price 
discrimination as such. 
C. Statutory Concerns 
Present price discrimination law focuses largely on two forms of 
injury. One is the injury that results from predatory or disciplinary 
pricing designed to destroy rivals of the seller or to deter them from 
competing. The other is the injury to competition that exists be-
tween firms that purchase from the same seller through low-priced 
and high-priced channels of distribution. These two forms of injury 
pose quite different challenges to price discrimination law. 
Discrimination is a curious companion of predatory or disciplinary 
pricing. It is clear that the immediate source of concern is that low 
prices may be used for bad purposes; the immediate cause of injury 
is the low price, not the discrimination. There is ample cause to 
believe that predatory pricing is very rare and to wonder whether 
disciplinary pricing is much more frequent. In any event, discrimi-
nation contributes to the process only if it somehow supports the 
lower prices. The only argument in favor of such support is that 
firms are more likely to engage in undesirable low pricing if it can 
be supported out of profits realized from other sales of the same 
product than if it must be supported out of an equal amount of other 
funds. The business psychology assumed by this argument is not 
entirely fanciful. In addition, it is possible to make the prophylactic 
argument that a statutory policy of single pricing would discourage 
predatory and disciplinary pricing by increasing the cost. Finally, 
the very fact of discrimination may be of some slight value in 
measuring the desirability of the low price. These concerns cannot 
be rejected out of hand. Nonetheless, they must confront both the 
danger that what appears . to be disciplinary pricing may reflect de-
sirable competition and the difficulty of measuring accurately the ex-
istence of price discrimination. 
Injury to competition between customers of the discriminating 
seller is easily understood. Customers who pay higher prices than 
their competitors pay are hampered in their competitive efforts. The 
major difficulty with building price discrimination law around this 
concern lies in the difficulty of determining whether price differ-
ences involve discrimination or a desirable response to competition 
and considerations of efficiency. 
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In summary, then, conduct that clearly involves price discrimi-
nation may have desirable or undesirable consequences. The nature 
of the questions that must be resolved in evaluating the conse-
quences is such that evaluation is often very difficult. No one has 
yet suggested how to define understandable statutory categories of 
desirable and undesirable discrimination, or how to administer a 
statute that would simply prohibit undesirable discrimination. 
These problems are encountered even on the assumption that 
price discrimination has been clearly shown. As is demonstrated in 
the next section, however, enormous difficulties are also encountered 
in any attempt to determine whether a given set of pricing trans-
actions in fact involves discrimination. 
JI. loENTIFYING PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
The difficulties of identifying price discrimination in actual trans-
actions present challenges to statutory regulation quite distinct from 
the difficulties of distinguishing between desirable and undesirable 
discrimination. The difficulties begin with the problems of identi-
fying and adjusting for differences in measurable costs, and are ex-
acerbated by differences in the time periods of various transactions, 
the full range of appropriate responses to competitive pressures, ar-
rangements that reduce uncertainty, and compensation for services 
performed by buyers. These difficulties are explored below. Sepa-
rately or together, they often raise high barriers to the task of admin-
istering a rule against discrimination without interfering with eco-
nomic efficiency and competition. 
A. Cost Variations 
As soon as different costs are incurred in providing substantially 
the same product to different customers, difficulties emerge in 
measuring and adjusting to the differences, even with respect to the 
tangible "hard" costs of production and distribution. 
An initial difficulty of measurement arises from the nature of cost 
accounting. In many circumstances, it is simply not possible either 
to create an abstract model or to generate the data needed to estab-
lish an absolute cost figure. The most that can be done is to adopt 
a reasonably plausible system that will provide consistent figures over 
time that are useful for some internal management purposes. Be-
cause of these difficulties, it would be foolhardy to legislate a re-
quirement that all prices be varied to maintain a uniform relation 
to the costs of each transaction, and fortunately no such require-
ment has ever been attempted. Single pricing is accepted without 
regard to possible cost differences. 
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A closely related difficulty shows the need to confine even a theo-
retical model of price discrimination. It may often be so expensive 
to determine the costs of different transactions, and to adjust prices 
accordingly, that the cost and price of the lowest-cost transactions 
would be increased above the single price that would prevail in the 
absence of such an adjustment. In such circumstances there is no 
sensible economic model that would suggest that sellers should 
undertake the burden of adjusting all prices to relative costs. Alter-
natively, a seller may be able to group customers according to a 
readily identifiable characteristic or group of characteristics roughly 
corresponding to the different costs incurred in dealing with them. 
The result may be a more rational relationship of prices to costs than 
would result from single pricing, and it may not be feasible to 
achieve more refined differentiations. Here too, ·there is no sen-
sible model of economic efficiency that would suggest that such 
grouping should be prohibited in favor of single pricing. 
Even if all costs could be determined accurately and at negligible 
cost, there is substantial difficulty in creating a model to define the 
appropriate method of relating prices to cost differences. Again, 
using simple figures, suppose it was determined that all of the di-
rectly measurable costs of dealing with one customer total $60, 
and that all of the directly measurable costs of dealing with another 
customer total $80. If the price to the high-cost customer is 
$100, what price is appropriate for the low-cost customer? Is 
it $80, reflecting only the absolute amount of cost savings? Or 
is it $75, reflecting the same proportion between price and measur-
able costs as the price charged the high-cost customer? Distressing 
as it may seem, either answer may be clearly right in some circum-
stances, and each may be highly questionable in most circumstances. 
Absolute cost differences are probably the appropriate measure 
of price differences if they rest on payments that are entirely external 
to the firm and that do not reflect any of the myriad economic func-
tions undertaken by it. If, for instance, the seller incurred common 
carrier charges of $5 in delivering to one customer, and $25 in de-
livering to the other, there is a strong argument that cost justification 
appears only to the extent of the $20 difference. 
Final prices should probably be proportional to measurable costs 
in situations in which all measurable cost differences reflect costs that 
are internal to the firm. The clearest situation is presented by a 
firm that can measure and allocate some, but not all, of its internal 
costs. If it can measure costs of $60 in dealing with one customer 
and costs of $80 in dealing with another, it seems appro_priate to allo-
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cate the unmeasurable costs in the same proportion as the measur-
able costs. The unmeasurable costs are internal to the firm, and re-
flect risks undertaken by it that deserve to be compensated. The 
same conclusion seems justified if the firm can superficially allocate 
"all" of its historic internal costs. If it can secure a price of $80 in 
selling to a $60 cost customer, the opportunity costs, rents, returns 
to risk, or pure profit that it is earning should be charged in the same 
proportion to higher-cost customers. 
Unfortunately, these conclusions seem weaker with obvious varia-
tions of the underlying assumptions. Suppose, for instance, the firm 
maintains its own fleet of delivery trucks and can demonstrate a 
highly rational $20 savings in the cost of delivery, including a rea-
sonable return to the investment and risk incurred in the delivery 
system. Should the $20 cost difference "justify" a $25 price differ-
ence on the ground that the high delivery-cost consumer should bear 
a greater share of the president's salary and the investment and risk 
in machine tools? It is difficult to find any clear answer. 
The assumption of constant costs in dealing with all customers, 
in short, makes it relatively easy to define and identify noncost 
pncmg. Once the assumption is discarded, however, it becomes 
more difficult to identify or define noncost pricing, even if attention 
is directed only to the obvious "out-of-pocket" costs of production 
and distribution. If there were no other reason to question the as-
. sertion that every customer should bear an appropriate share of 
nonallocable "overhead" costs, differences in measurable hard costs 
make it difficult to define the appropriate share. These problems 
pale to near insignificance, however, when they are compared to the 
allocation problems that arise from the more intangible costs of risk, 
uncertainty, and services incurred or avoided by the buyer. 
B. Time Variables 
Two different perspectives suggest the major ways in which dif-
ferences in time complicate the relationships between prices and 
costs. First, cyclical fluctuations in demand must be taken into ac-
count. Second, transactions concluded at the same moment may in-
volve different future time periods. Each of these perspectives in-
troduces elements that cannot be neatly captured and translated into 
appropriate variations in the price-cost relationship. 
Cyclical fluctuations in demand that affect all sellers of the same 
basic product have an obvious impact on prices. Such fluctuations 
may occur irregularly as a result of the overall health of the eco-
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nomy. They may also occur predictably, following regular patterns 
peculiar to a specific industry. It is clear that transactions under-
taken at different stages of such cycles cannot be compared. Cus-
tomers who purchase in seasonal slack periods and incur storage 
costs, for instance, obviously should not be required to pay the same · 
price as customers who defer purchases until the hectic peak period. 
Even customers who purchase for immediate use in the slack period 
may rightly assert that they should not be required to share the cost 
of facilities maintained solely to satisfy peak demand. More gen-
erally, it is accepted that in periods of general excess capacity in an 
industry prices should tend toward the short-term variable costs of 
production, while in periods of inadequate capacity prices should ex-
ceed the full costs of production. 
General industry cycles do not afford any basis for measuring and 
assessing an appropriate degree of change in cost-price relationships. 
They do provide, however, a useful basis for determining that trans-
actions undertaken in one phase of a general cycle cannot be com-
pared to transactions in another phase. In addition, they provide 
a provocative analogy by which to frame the question whether 
periodic changes in the demand perceived by a single firm warrant 
similar price changes in the absence of any change in overall market 
conditions. It is plausible to argue that whenever a firm believes 
that it will not be able to operate at full capacity at the price of its 
most recent transactions, it should be able to lower the price to all 
customers until it believes that capacity operations are ensured. The 
difficulty with this argument is that it suggests that a seller should 
be able to charge whatever price it thinks it can obtain from each 
of its customers in order to remain as close to continual full capacity 
operation as possible. Prices would respond to the bargaining power 
and ability of sellers and buyers. Although there is no self-evident 
reason why bargain-determined prices are less efficient than those 
determined by more impersonal market forces, there is no need to 
reach a firm conclusion on this point. It is sufficient to note that 
there is an unresolved difficulty. 
Transactions covering different time periods provide easier tests. 
Whenever the buyer or seller undertakes a legally binding commit-
ment for the future, the transaction ceases to be comparable to spot-
market transactions or transactions covering commitments for dif-
ferent periods in the future. Risks are assumed that demand com-
pensation. There is no reason, for example, why the price for 
a carload of potatoes delivered three months from today should be 
the same as the price for present delivery plus the cost of storage, 
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even if both carloads have already been harvested and put in storage. 
Nor is there any means of measuring a "reasonable" risk factor to 
adjust the relationship between price and the physical costs of pro-
duction. Even in organized futures markets, the relationship be-
tween prices is based on the conflicting judgments of many traders, 
drawing from predictions of both demand and cost. Potatoes to be 
delivered in three months, in short, are not the same product as 
potatoes delivered on the spot. 
Apart from the risk and product-definition factors, it is reasonable 
to argue that prices in different time periods should not be compared 
whenever time differences permit different degrees of variation in 
tangible costs. The longer the time period the greater the number 
of cost elements that can be varied. There is no apparent reason 
to demand an identical relationship between prices and costs that in-
clude different variable and fixed components. Suppose two sepa-
rate contracts were made on January 1, 1975, and January 1, 1976, 
each calling for the delivery of an identical quantity of the same 
product on January 1, 1977. If more inputs could be varied over the 
two-year period than over the one-year period, there is no reason 
to insist on a uniform price even though all output might be pro-
duced in December 1976, at an apparently uniform cost. 
The time dimension, in short, means that a comparison of cost-
price relationships is clearly justified only as to transactions that are 
undertaken at substantially the same time and involve performances 
over substantially the same period. It may be possible to draw upon 
recognized patterns of commercial significance to expand the com-
parable periods to some extent, particularly if there are well-estab-
lished market periods and the selling firm operates at a constant 
relation to capacity and cannot show any reason to expect a change. 
At a very early point, however, it will become impossible to assume 
comparability. Appropriate adjustments for incomparability would 
be hazardous, and often capricious. It might be possible to respond 
to this difficulty by asserting that sellers are free to set different 
prices for different future periods, but that they must allow free access 
by all customers to purchases on the same terms for any future period. 
This response will not do, for future commitments by the seller, in 
reliance on the commitment of the customer, are a form of credit that 
should not be subject to legal tests of discrimination. 
C. Meeting Competition 
As a practical matter, the most formidable obstacle to legal regu-
lation of cost-price relationships arises from the fact that many sales 
April-May 1977) Price Discrimination 975 
are made with little or no regard to cost. Market constraints limit 
the seller's freedom, even if they do not determine a unique single 
price. Any sale that covers variable costs and represents the most 
favorable opportunity available to the seller is good business. The 
available opportunities are in tum shaped by competition, both from 
close substitute products and from quite different customer expen-
ditures or investments. The need to meet competition means that 
sellers often cannot consider the full long-range costs of each sale. 
More importantly, it means that sellers are apt to adjust prices ac-
cording to estimates of the opportunities left open by competition: 
better prices are likely to be available to marginal customers simply 
because of the danger that they will go elsewhere. The pressure 
to adjust prices to meet alternative competitive opportunities open 
to buyers is so strong that attempts at regulation face immense practi-
cal obstacles. The Robinson-Patman Act is violated almost as often 
as highway speed laws. Despite the practical problems of enforce-
ment, speed laws make sense both because they have a very perva-
sive practical impact and because there are sound reasons for con-
trolling automobile speed. The practical problems of enforcing price 
discrimination laws, on the other hand, reflect deeper theoretical 
problems. For a host of reasons, business firms should indeed be 
left free to respond to many of the pressures that force them to com-
pete in the short run. 
One of the most commonly stated· theoretical reasons for favoring 
competitive variations in price-cost relationships arises from the 
nature of oligopoly pricing. At a minimum, a firm with substantial 
pricing freedom often lacks clear market information on the most 
appropriate price. Selected price variations may provide the most 
efficient method of gathering information about demand and thereby 
improve the opportunities for price competition. Beyond the infor-
mation function, firms in an oligopoly market may employ selective 
price cuts, often secretly, in an attempt to secure sales that might 
otherwise be made elsewhere, as was described in section I. En-
forced price uniformity might well remove the most probable oppor-
tunity for price competition in important oligopoly markets. 
Price discrimination may also be adopted as one of the most ef-
ficient means of competitive promotion. Price reductions may be 
offered in selected markets or to selected customers for the purpose 
of inducing experimentation and future sales at nondiscriminatory 
prices. The result may better enhance competition and better serve 
customers than would alternative forms of advertising and promo-
tion. 
976 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:962 
Variations in cost between different firms provide quite different 
reasons for favoring prices that respond to competitive opportunities 
rather than to individual firm costs. Even single-product firms that 
employ the same technology and the same tangible inputs may exper-
ience differences in the total costs of serving different customers. 
There is every reason to allow each customer to enjoy a price that 
corresponds to the costs of the firm that can serve it most efficiently, 
and to subject that firm to competitive pressure from other firms. 
And there is no reason to deny any rival supplier the right to meet 
the efficient firm's price if the sale would be the rival's best oppor-
tunity. 
The same point holds true, in much more complex fashion, in situ-
ations in which different firms produce differentiated products, in 
different overall product mixes, employing different technologies. 
Initially, it is clear that there is no reason why any firm should be 
compelled to maintain a constant relationship between the prices and 
costs of its different products. Each product is sold in a different 
market, facing different supply and demand conditions (often at dif-
ferent points in individual market cycles), and must be treated as 
a distinctive pricing problem. Even with respect to a single product, 
all customers may benefit from a flexible response to differences in 
demand that result from variations in the attractiveness of substitute 
products to different users. Increased output of one product in the 
firm's product mix may provide the benefits of noncost pricing not 
only to other customers for the same product, but also to customers 
who purchase different products from the same firm. It is, more-
over, possible that response to market opportunities may provide a 
more rational range of relationships between prices and costs than 
would emerge from self-conscious attempts at regulation, given the 
fact that none of the firms is apt to have any clear picture of the 
allocation of its own costs among its different products, nor any 
means or sound business reason for developing a clear picture. 
The meeting competition arguments also provide a new perspec-
tive on the capacity utilization concerns explored earlier. Meeting 
competition arguments suggest that a firm with excess capacity 
should be able to utilize its capacity by pricing down to the most 
favorable opportunity it can seize. Allowing such behavior, without 
requiring reduction of prices for all transactions, may achieve the 
best utilization of total industry capacity and provide individual cus-
tomers with the most favorable combination of price and product va-
riety. The assumption that each customer should bear the same ali-
quot share of fixed costs, built into present price discrimination laws, 
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may injure both sellers and buyers. If all prices must be reduced 
to capture the marginal buyer, the seller may find it better to forgo 
the marginal sale, thereby passing up its contribution toward over-
head. Over time, this pattern could result in less efficient invest-
ment in plant, technology, and product mix to the harm of all con-
cerned. 
The argument based on capacity utilization can be illustrated with 
figures drawn from a closely related argument based on the advan-
tages of capacity expansion. This argument also shows that the com-
petition to be met includes the competition from potential entry, in-
cluding potential vertical integration by present customers into the 
seller's market. Suppose that the largest current plant for producing 
thingbobs has an annual capacity of 10,000 units, at a full cost of 
$1 each. Developments in technology have made it possible to 
produce at a cost of $1 in plants having an annual capacity of 2,000 
units, and to produce at a cost of 85¢ in plants having an annual 
capacity of 20,000 units. Recapture of an investment in plant 
expansion is doubtful, however, since there is already some excess 
capacity, and it seems probable that, given competitive response and 
the relative inelasticity of demand, the largest firm could not sell 
more than 14,000 units at a price of 85¢. At the same time, several 
large customers have been exploring the possibility of building 
2,000-unit plants in order to avoid reliance on the market. Discus-
sions with some of them have shown that the advantages of internal 
production, even at a unit cost of $1, are great enough to justify in-
ternal expansion unless a market price of 80¢ is available. The large 
firm has concluded that if it expanded to a 20,000-unit capacity, it 
should be able to sell 12,000 units at a price of 95¢ and 8,000 addi-
tional units at a price of 80¢ to four large customers. All customers 
would then be better off. Although competitive relationships be-
tween the small and large customers would be altered, internal 
production by the large customers would alter the relationship as-
well, giving the large customers advantages they value highly. The 
supplier should be allowed to adopt its proposed program. 
The risk reduction perspective provides another useful view of the 
meeting competition concern. An individual seller can never know 
the highest price that will secure a marginal sale, thereby "meeting" 
competition. This difficulty is particularly acute when product dif-
ferentiation requires calculation of appropriate price differences, and 
when there is room to calculate the value to the customer of the ad-
vantages of continuing an established relationship or the disadvantages 
of establishing a new relationship. The only rational behavior is to 
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offer the price that best balances added revenue against the risk of 
losing the sale. Any attempt to measure the appropiateness of this 
price as simply meeting rather than "beating" competition is doomed 
to failure. 
So long as price competition is thought desirable, in short, it must 
be a short-run phenomenon that forces disparities in the relations be-
tween costs and prices. Only a thorough substitution of regulation 
for market transactions could alter the results. 
D. Reduction of Uncertainty 
The most complex arguments confounding the relationship be-
tween prices and costs arise from the intangible and unmeasurable 
costs imposed by uncertainty. Two illustrations will be provided to 
demonstrate that at times considerations of uncertainty may justify 
different prices despite identity in all of the measurable costs of pro-
duction and distribution. A third illustration will be used to show 
that at other times considerations of uncertainty may not justify dif-
ferent prices. The conclusion to be drawn from these illustrations 
should become apparent: since there often is no practicable way of 
measuring the appropriate price adjustment to compensate for re-
ductions of uncertainty, no regulation of pricing could avoid prohibit-
ing highly desirable behavior. 
The first illustration parallels an example already used in a dif-
ferent context. Shortly before the start of a year, one customer en-
ters into a binding contract to take delivery of 10,000 units at the 
first of each month in the following year at the seller's prevailing 
price. A second customer, without making any such commitment, 
in fact orders 10,000 units for spot delivery on the first of each month 
during the same year. Analysis of the provable costs of dealing with 
each customer shows that all costs are the same. Nonetheless, there 
is no reason to deny the right of the firm-commitment customer to a 
price reduction that reflects the commitment assumed in the contract. 
Indeed, this commitment may have reduced the seller's uncertainty 
as to the probable ranges of output during the year, facilitated the or-
dering of variable inputs, conduced to improved production flow, and 
thereby reduced the costs of dealing with all customers. Apart from 
such tangible savings, increased certainty may well permit lower re-
turns to capital. The very same phenomena can occur without a con-
tractual commitment. The seller, for example, could adopt a price 
schedule that provides retroactive rebates based upon the cumulative 
purchases of each customer during the year. Experience with the 
market might enable the seller to judge the effects of the discount 
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schedule, to reduce uncertainty, and to reduce overall costs of the 
operation in ways that cannot be measured or even demonstrated. 
Even though all customers purchase in spot delivery transactions and 
there is no difference in measurable costs, the regularity induced by 
the retroactive rebate may reduce costs in all transactions. 
The second illustration is simply a variation on the first. In many 
markets there may be some buyers that regularly purchase large 
quantities and that customarily prefer to deal with an unchanging 
small group of suppliers. Lower prices to these buyers may be jus-
tified in part by the meeting competition concerns already explored; 
to a large extent, the fact that they enjoy a greater range of compet-
itive alternatives may reflect nothing more than cost savings enjoyed 
by one seller or another at various times and in various ways. In 
addition to these considerations, however, lower prices may also be 
justified on grounds parallel to those identified with the cumulative 
volume of purchases discount. The actual experience of the sellers, 
both individually and collectively, is that a consistent price advantage 
results in markedly steadier purchasing patterns, reducing uncer-
tainty and facilitating planning. Once again, the net result could be 
that all buyers benefit. 
The third illustration runs counter to the second. Special prices 
to large buyers may result from nothing more than the desire of each 
firm to reduce the danger that it will lose a particularly attractive 
customer. Among sellers collectively, the result may be that, in an 
imperfect market, price competition works effectively as to large 
buyers, but not as to small buyers. It is even possible that the 
profit pressure resulting from competition for large customers en-
ables the oligopolists to maintain higher prices for small transactions 
than would result if uniform prices were adopted for all transactions. 
Bizarre as it may seem, it is not impossible that lower prices to some 
customers could thus "cause" an increase in other prices. It is very 
difficult to find any model of economic efficiency to justify this re-
sult, and very easy to fear the impact on competition between large 
and small customers that otherwise are equally efficient. 
The uncertainty factor thus complicates the price picture still fur-
ther. It is hard to find a practical measure of the cost savings that 
result from reduced uncertainty. It might be tempting to argue that 
whatever price has been set must be an accurate reflection of all 
the factors of meeting competition and reduced uncertainty, since 
the price has been made by a firm that at least is trying to make 
the best of its own expert market judgment. Unfortunately, the 
market may work more efficiently with respect to some transactions 
980 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:962 
than others. But if the market cannot be relied upon to achieve 
model-perfect results in all transactions, it may nonetheless work far 
better than any nonmarket attempt to sort out and weigh all of the 
confused and potentially conflicting elements. 
E. Customer-Performed Services 
Customers engaged in distributing a manufacturer's product may 
perform a wide variety of services that benefit both supplier and ul-
timate buyers. The market in which these intermediate distributors 
operate may function so as to reimburse the costs of such services, 
but that is not always so. It may often be entirely appropriate to 
allow the seller to reduce its prices to support customer services in 
reselling the product, even though there is no difference in the costs 
of dealing with customers who perform services and those who do 
not. 
An example of customer-provided services that has become fa-
miliar in the context of various vertical restraints is the demonstration 
of stereo equipment. Some stereo stores make substantial invest-
ments in providing demonstration facilities that enable customers to 
compare different equipment, while other stereo stores do not. It 
may prove very difficult to prevent buyers from shopping in the 
higher-priced demonstrator store and buying at a lower-priced store 
that has not incurred the costs of demonstration facilities. One pos-
sible way to prevent this may be for the supplier to provide a discount 
to stores that meet specified standards of demonstration performance. 
The discount enables the stores to provide the demonstration facility, 
thereby enhancing the sales of the equipment from all outlets, and 
at the same time to remain competitive in price with the other stores. 
It may be much more efficient for the manufacturer to purchase this 
service by a price discount than to provide the service directly, par-
ticularly since most efficient retail distribution may require sale of 
many lines of equipment. The price discount, further, may restrict 
competition among dealers less than such an alternative means of 
protection as an exclusive distributorship. 
It is not an answer to say that the manufacturer should allow all 
customers access to the form of distribution subsidized by a lower 
price. In many market settings, efficient distribution may require 
a limit on the number of distributors that provide the service. A 
familiar illustration is the "stocking jobber." A manufacturer may 
find that sales of its products are greatly enhanced if all end 
users have prompt access to replacement parts or additional units out 
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of a local distributor's inventory. At the same time, most sales may 
be made more efficiently by order for delivery direct from the manu-
facturer to the customer. It may make excellent sense to provide 
a price discount to enable a single distributor in each market area 
to provide the inventory-stocking service and to limit all other distrib-
utors to the function of securing orders for delivery from the manu-
facturer. 
Functional discounts may be justified by the same arguments. Al-
though there may be identical costs in dealing both with wholesalers 
who redistribute to small retailers and with large, direct-buying re-
tailers, it may be· entirely proper to allow lower prices to the whole-
salers. 
If there is to be any limit imposed on the price advantages given 
to customers on account of distribution services performed by them, 
it is plain that it cannot be based on costs incurred by their supplier. 
Instead, the limit must be defined with respect to the costs and risks 
incurred by the distributors. Even then, the task of regulation seems 
almost hopeless. A large and very well-known retailer, for instance, 
may incur costs of overall operation that cannot possibly be identi-
fied to any single product it carries. By simply carrying a particular 
product, such a retailer may provide substantial benefits both to the 
manufacturer and to other distributors who carry the same product, 
because of the quality and prestige associated with all products han-
dled by that retailer. Any attempt to identify such effects, or to 
measure the compensation appropriate for them, would be rash. It 
may be that there is no such effect when the nation's largest grocery 
chain carries the nation's best-selling brand of com flakes, but if that 
judgment is sound, there are few judgments that could claim even 
the same shaky degree of confidence. 
ill. SUMMARY 
Enough has been said to demonstrate the two basic propositions 
urged at the outset. Even when it is clear that price discrimination 
has occurred, it remains a complex task to sort through the many 
different phenomena of discrimination and to evaluate their desira-
bility. In addition, the appropriate relationship between prices and 
costs is extraordinarily complex. Not only is cost accounting imper-
fect, but prices should and do respond to a great number of factors 
that cannot enter into any accounting of investments made or exter-
nal obligations incurred. In many situations, a firm may not only 
increase its own profits but also promote economic efficiency by set-
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ting different prices to respond to differences in the demand for its 
product presented by different customers. In light of the inade-
quacy of the diagnostic tools available to judicial or administrative 
tribunals, or to the business firms they might be charged to regulate, 
it would be unwise to pursue the task of regulating price discrimi-
nation for the purpose of promoting the values of competition and 
economic efficiency. If regulation is to be justified for other pur-
poses, it must be justified in terms that acknowledge that it will often 
impair economic efficiency. 
The most likely goal to be pursued by regulation would be the 
protection of small firms. Regulation of price discrimination by their 
suppliers will sometimes protect small firms against economically un-
desirable pricing. More often, it will protect them against destruc-
tion by their own economic inefficiency. Immediate social and 
political values might nonetheless warrant the effort. If regulation 
is to continue, however, substantial changes should be made in pres-
ent law to raise the threshold of injury, to recognize the full range 
of cost-justification complexities, to understand the nature of meet-
ing general market competition, to reflect the importance of re-
ducing risk and uncertainty, and to accommodate the need to recog-
nize customer-performed services. No better judgment seems pos-
sible than that a much-improved law would still be widely ignored 
and would still lead to condemnation of many price differences that 
in fact promote economic efficiency. Only a legislative body can 
reach the final judgment whether these losses are justified in the 
service of social and political ends that may occasionally, often by 
chance, improve economic efficiency as well. 
